By Soichiro Kuboniwa

Yomiuri Shimbun Staff Writer

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's administration is pushing for stronger national intelligence capabilities. Although reform efforts in this area have stagnated for about 20 years since the first administration of late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's Headquarters for Intelligence Strategy in February compiled a proposal for the government to strengthen the nation's intelligence capabilities.

Why is the administration making these moves? Akihisa Shiozaki, an LDP House of Representatives lawmaker who serves as the head of the secretariat of the party panel, discussed the matter during an interview with The Yomiuri Shimbun.

He also highlighted the importance of raising awareness of the issue among politicians. The following is excerpted from the interview.

Growing importance for national security

The Yomiuri Shimbun: Why is the discussion on strengthening intelligence capabilities being pushed for under the Takaichi administration?

Akihisa Shiozaki: Strengthening Japan's intelligence capabilities has been a topic of discussion for nearly 20 years.

From 2006 to 2007, during the first Abe administration, my father, Yasuhisa (Shiozaki), served as chief cabinet secretary. Serving as his secretary, I was involved in a project within the Prime Minister's Office aimed at strengthening the nation's intelligence capabilities.

It is not that the current discussion on strengthening intelligence capabilities arose suddenly. It is part of a broader effort to address security issues, and steps were taken also for (the establishment of) the Law on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets; the security clearance system that certifies eligibility to handle critical information in the field of economic security; and legislation for enabling active cyber defense.

Momentum grew as Prime Minister Takaichi and LDP Policy Research Council Chairperson Takayuki Kobayashi each expressed their intention to strengthen intelligence capabilities when they ran in the party leadership election in 2025.

Yomiuri: How has the situation changed compared to what it was during the first Abe administration?

Shiozaki: Changes in the security environment surrounding East Asia are a major factor. Concerns are also growing regarding influence operations and interference in electoral processes by foreign governments (and entities).

It also matters that the role of intelligence capabilities has dramatically increased in every security decision-making process with the development of diverse methods -- including SIGINT (signals intelligence), which involves intercepting and analyzing communications to gather information.

The LDP's proposal outlined 14 specific measures with three main pillars: raising awareness among politicians; eliminating silos among government bodies; and fundamentally strengthening intelligence-gathering capabilities.

Reviewing counterintelligence protocols

Yomiuri: Why did you include "raising awareness among politicians, who are the 'customers' of intelligence" at the very beginning of the proposal?

Shiozaki: Members of the Diet are expected to safeguard information that intelligence service members have risked their lives to gather. They cannot adopt a passive attitude, like ordering "omakase" (chef's course) at a sushi counter.

Unless politicians first change their mindset regarding the importance and precariousness of intelligence, information will not be utilized effectively, no matter how much the intelligence community is strengthened.

In this context, reviewing counterintelligence protocols to protect critical information from foreign intelligence-gathering activities is crucial for raising awareness.

We have received feedback a number of times from the intelligence communities of like-minded nations that there is room for improvement in Japan's awareness and practices regarding information security from an international perspective.

Japanese lawmakers and bureaucrats are free to bring mobile phones and other devices even to sensitive meetings. It is also problematic, in terms of the risks of eavesdropping and security breaches, that electronic devices can be freely brought into the Prime Minister's Office.

The approach taken by the Five Eyes countries (an intelligence alliance of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) serves as a useful reference. Their protocols are established with a thorough understanding of the extent to which information can be stolen through SIGINT.

If Japan were to regulate the bringing of electronic devices into government facilities -- for example, by installing metal detectors at entrances to classified areas of government facilities -- it would serve as a catalyst for raising awareness.

Moving away from verbal communication

Yomiuri: How can silos among government ministries and agencies be eliminated?

Shiozaki: We included the documentation of intelligence reports in our proposal. This may have come as a shock to those on the front lines of domestic intelligence.

Japan has long had a culture of relying on verbal communication, and there has been a tendency that the higher classification levels are more likely to not be documented. But the question is whether this is the correct approach for intelligence. Since it is not recorded, it cannot be examined before or after the fact.

As for why interorganizational information sharing is not taking place as expected, it can be attributed to personnel (arrangements). But we also heard concerns about how shared information will be used. If it is properly documented in reports, one can understand where and how their information was used or not used.

From the standpoints of trust, quality assurance and interagency coordination, information should, in principle, be documented. Global standard practices should become the norm in Japan as well.

Yomiuri: Is there an inclination toward the Five Eyes alliance, which focuses on communications interception and the sharing of classified information?

Shiozaki: As nations with advanced intelligence capabilities, there is much we can learn from them. In discussions toward the establishment of the Law on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, the U.S. military pointed out concerns regarding the potential for information leaks from Japan, and this became a key factor in the legislation.

We are not in discussions with the aim of joining the Five Eyes, but I believe possessing intelligence capabilities that meet international standards is vital in terms of coordinating with like-minded nations through information sharing.

We have studied many countries, but the U.K. and Australia were particularly instructive. The U.K. is, of course, a historic intelligence powerhouse, and since it also has a parliamentary system like Japan, there are many aspects of its institutional design that can serve as a reference.

Also, although it is not widely known, Australia is an advanced intelligence nation that combines a strict intelligence security system with strong external intelligence capabilities. Australia has an intelligence facility called "Pine Gap," which it operates jointly with the U.S., and conducts analysis of cutting-edge SIGINT and reconnaissance satellite data.

In terms of international standards, while the ability to acquire intelligence is important, the ability to prevent it from being stolen is even more critical.

If Japan's security is lax, the intelligence shared by like-minded nations will leak. Intelligence systems are targeted at their most vulnerable "weak link." If Japan is perceived as weak, those nations will not share intelligence with us.

Taking measures against information leaks

Yomiuri: Japan is increasingly dependent on foreign-made communication equipment at home.

Shiozaki: Regarding communications environment security, it is not realistic to eliminate all risks by having everything be domestically produced.

Given the current global dispersion of supply chains, it is difficult to completely eliminate components originating from specific countries from equipment in circulation.

That is precisely why it is important to take measures to address risks rather than applying a blanket ban.

Especially when handling sensitive information, we must implement technical and operational measures based on the assumption information leaks will occur. To that end, raising understanding and awareness of intelligence is of the utmost importance.

Yomiuri: How will discussions regarding the strengthening of intelligence capabilities proceed within the government and the ruling coalition going forward?

Shiozaki: The party proposal is the result of a series of hearings from various ministries and other organs after the party leadership election last autumn.

Even the ministries and agencies responsible for domestic intelligence shared our fundamental concerns and were receptive to reform.

In the past, there was an atmosphere where politicians were supposed to stay out of the matter, but now ministries and agencies concerned are cooperative, and I sense a shift in the times.

We plan to release a second proposal around this summer. We will formulate concrete measures regarding the strengthening of external intelligence-gathering capabilities and counterintelligence -- areas that must be addressed urgently following the enactment of a bill establishing a national intelligence council, which has been submitted to the current special Diet session.

If the government's side establishes an expert panel after the second proposal is submitted, it may be possible to submit a Cabinet-sponsored bill (based on proposals) as early as the ordinary Diet session in 2027.

----

This article is from The Yomiuri Shimbun. Neither Dow Jones Newswires, MarketWatch, Barron's nor The Wall Street Journal were involved in the creation of this content.

YDN-M0000192039-1

(END) Dow Jones Newswires

April 03, 2026 06:11 ET (10:11 GMT)

Copyright (c) 2026 The Yomiuri Shimbun