Every rival is pushing 58.com out of the market in its own way, and if Yao Jinbo doesn't move faster and more decisively, the speed of repairing the ship won't keep pace with the rate it's sinking.

Before AI could make life better, 58.com employees started panicking first. In early August, 58.com was reported to have launched large-scale layoffs, with the entire sales team across all business lines set to be reduced from 16,000 to 6,000 people, potentially further cut to 4,000 next year. Just two months earlier, 58.com CEO Yao Jinbo had reclaimed control of Anjuke and four major business units, personally stepping to the front lines. With power consolidation, layoffs, and debt maturities looming, what cards does Yao Jinbo still hold? After reviewing Yi Ming Pharma, GOGOX, Zhuanzhuan, and others, it seems none can fill the gap before 2027.

Layoff Storm After Power Consolidation

According to leaks, the layoff milestones are set for August 30, September 30, October 30, and November 30, spanning the entire second half of the year, showing a rhythm of "advancing by schedule, cutting monthly." Users claiming to be 58.com employees added in comments, "It's gradually being controlled to within 6,000, not stopping at 6,000." Reportedly, the team size will be further reduced to 4,000 next year. If both rounds of adjustments are fully implemented, the overall reduction ratio could reach as high as 75%. Going further back, 58.com has repeatedly faced layoff rumors, with headcount shrinking from a peak of 40,000 to about 20,000.

The sales force caught in this storm was, just a few years ago, one of the most formidable ground operations in China's internet industry. According to reports, when DCM China co-founder Hurst Lin walked into 58.com, he was stunned—"Everywhere were salespeople carrying briefcases, making phone calls and closing deals." In his view, 58.com sold advertising as content, which heavily tested the team's ability to attract customers, and that was exactly the team's strength. In 2010, DCM consequently invested $15 million in 58.com's Series C round. This team's daily routine was "ground promotion"—sweeping streets, visiting stores, making calls, urging merchants to open memberships, and buy top placements. 58.com's business model wasn't complicated: merchants posted information, users viewed it, and merchants paid for exposure and promotion. Through them, 58.com brought millions of small and micro merchants onto the platform and generated deal after deal. Paying merchants grew from 187,000 in 2012 to 323,000 in 2013, with annual revenue surpassing $140 million, up 67% year-over-year. That October, 58.com listed on the NYSE; two years later, it merged with Ganji.com to become the absolute leader in classified information, with the new company valued at over $10 billion. The merchant base built by the ground promotion force gave 58.com the confidence to go public and swallow competitors. However, more than a decade later, this team that once helped 58.com conquer the market is now being dismantled by its own boss.

"A 75% layoff ratio isn't common even in the internet industry," one netizen commented. "This isn't optimization or structural adjustment—it's cutting off an arm to survive." Just two months after Yao Jinbo reclaimed power and returned to the front lines, why such urgency?

Debt Looms While Cash Generation Falters

Time is running out for Yao Jinbo. In September 2020, 58.com completed its $8.7 billion privatization delisting, with funding sources including an $800 million two-year bridge loan and a $1.65 billion seven-year loan. Counting from September 2020, the seven-year loan now has less than 13 months to maturity. Estimates suggest 58.com's annual interest expenses alone could exceed 1 billion yuan. These debts weren't particularly daunting at their peak, but 58.com is no longer what it used to be, with increasingly weakened cash-generating ability. In 2019, 58.com's revenue was still 15.58 billion yuan; by 2024, it had fallen to around 6.5 billion yuan. Yao Jinbo's loud calls for "profit discipline" failed to stop nearly 10 billion yuan in revenue from disappearing. The company also shifted from profitability to losses. In Q4 2024, it posted a net loss of $19.7 million for the quarter, with operating expenses exceeding 80% of revenue; according to media reports, in Q1 2025, revenue continued to decline, down 15% year-over-year, with net profit falling 30%.

Every track 58.com operates in has formidable rivals. This "magical website" once covered almost all essential scenarios in ordinary people's lives—job hunting, renting, buying and selling used cars, and finding housekeeping services—but today it's crowded with competitors far stronger than itself. Recruitment was once 58.com's lifeline and cash cow. But in Q1 2025, active users on 58.com's recruitment business dropped 42% year-over-year, nearly halving. During the same period, BOSS Zhipin's revenue was 1.923 billion yuan, up 12.9% year-over-year, with 6.4 million paying corporate clients. 58.com was once synonymous with recruitment; now, on job seekers' phones, it's been pushed to the second or third screen. Real estate is even more brutal. Anjuke could once contend with Beike, but as time went on, the gap widened: Beike's 2025 full-year net revenue was 94.6 billion yuan, with total transaction value of 3.18 trillion yuan. Meanwhile, Anjuke, since its failed IPO in 2021, has never publicly disclosed any performance data again—its revenue back then was only around 8 billion yuan. The gap between the two isn't just scale; it's a generational difference in business models and strategic choices. Anjuke still relies on monetizing traffic, while Beike has grasped the entire transaction chain—VR home viewing, contracting, loans, and title transfer. But 58.com's traffic is negligible compared to players like Douyin, Xiaohongshu, and Meituan. 58.com has fewer than 90 million monthly active users, while Meituan surpassed 500 million monthly active users in Q2 2025—less than one-fifth. More critically, Meituan users open the app mostly to order food, book hotels, or buy group deals, carrying clear purchase intent; 58.com users mostly browse and leave—the former is transaction traffic, the latter is browsing traffic, and the quality of traffic isn't on the same level. Used cars aren't much better. According to public reports, 58.com's market share in this sector has fallen below 15%, continuing to shrink, and it's been pushed to the margins among mainstream used car platforms. What are competitors doing? Uxin's Q1 2025 revenue was 504 million yuan, up 58% year-over-year; Guazi Used Cars received third-party certification as "China's #1 in used car transaction volume." Every rival is pushing 58.com out of the market in its own way, and this ship is visibly sinking. If Yao Jinbo doesn't move faster and more decisively, the speed of repairing won't keep pace with the rate of leaking.

Zhuanzhuan: The Last Ace?

But the money saved from layoffs can hardly fill the debt hole about to mature, so Yao Jinbo needs a few playable cards. Yi Ming Pharma is the one most resembling an ace in his hand. According to a June 2025 announcement, Yao Jinbo acquired 23% of A-share listed company Yi Ming Pharma for 662 million yuan, becoming its actual controller. The market's initial reaction was excited. After 58.com's privatization delisting, with Anjuke's IPO failing, Tiandao's listing withdrawn, and GOGOX's market cap down 99%, all three capital channels were blocked. When Yao Jinbo suddenly gained control of an A-share company, the outside world almost unanimously interpreted it as a prelude to a "backdoor listing." After the announcement, Yi Ming Pharma saw seven consecutive limit-up days, with the stock price rising from 13.3 yuan to 23.63 yuan, giving Yao Jinbo a floating gain of nearly 56%. But this card isn't as glamorous as it appears. Yi Ming Pharma's revenue is declining year by year—from 2022 to 2025, revenue was 857 million yuan, 667 million yuan, 652 million yuan, and 636 million yuan, respectively. Although net profit has rebounded—2025 full-year net profit was 92.58 million yuan, up 101.57% year-over-year—it's heavily dependent on a single product, Miglitol Tablets. In 2024, this diabetes drug contributed 474 million yuan in revenue, accounting for over 70% of total company revenue. Looking closely at the deal terms, things aren't so simple either. The original controller, Gao Fan, committed upon transferring shares that from 2025 to 2027, Yi Ming Pharma's annual revenue would be no less than 600 million yuan, with non-GAAP net profit no less than 30 million yuan. If not met, Gao Fan must compensate in cash. This means Yao Jinbo would have to wait until the performance commitment period ends in 2027 at the earliest before injecting 58 Group's assets into Yi Ming Pharma. And that year is precisely when 58.com's seven-year loan matures. In other words, the backdoor listing the market expects is far-off water that can't quench the near-term thirst.

GOGOX is another listed company actually controlled by Yao Jinbo, but its condition is worse. As of writing, GOGOX's total market cap is only about HK$86.49 million. A company with a market cap under HK$100 million, even if it could issue up to 20% new shares under Hong Kong rules, would only raise one or two million Hong Kong dollars; using such a low-value stock for pledged loans wouldn't attract banks either—at this scale, it essentially loses any meaningful room for maneuvering. 58.com also owns Shenqi Capital, which has invested in dozens of projects including Ujian, UU Running, and Lefit Sports, with investments in new energy and tech consumption. But these investments are mostly at early stages, unlikely to generate substantial returns in the short term, let alone be liquidated on a large scale before 2027.

The second-hand trading platform Zhuanzhuan might be the most dependable card Yao Jinbo holds, if time is on his side. Zhuanzhuan was an internally incubated project at 58.com. In 2015, Huang Wei, then vice president of 58.com, founded Zhuanzhuan, and over the next decade it secured investments from Tencent, Xiaomi, and other institutions, with its last financing round valuing it at over $3 billion. In 2025, Zhuanzhuan's revenue surpassed 20 billion yuan, with over 400 million registered users and 50 million monthly active users, positioning it at the top of the second-hand e-commerce track. In April 2026, Huang Wei signaled a clear intention to go public: planning to launch a Hong Kong IPO within the next three years. Against this backdrop, Zhuanzhuan initiated a "de-58ification" structural adjustment. In May 2026, Beijing Zhuanzhuan Spirit Technology Co., Ltd., the parent company, underwent business registration changes, with Yao Jinbo resigning as director. Meanwhile, Beijing Yunqi Internet Investment Co., Ltd., where Yao Jinbo serves as legal representative, also exited the shareholder lineup. But the exit is only on the surface; at the core, Yao Jinbo hasn't truly let go. Another core operating entity of Zhuanzhuan, Qingdao Zhuanzhuan Technology Co., Ltd., still lists Yao Jinbo as its legal representative and actual controller; Beijing Yunqi Internet still holds 48.885% of Qingdao Zhuanzhuan, and this company is wholly owned by Beijing 58 Information Technology Co., Ltd., whose actual controller remains Yao Jinbo. The weight of this card is undeniable—if Zhuanzhuan successfully lists, Yao Jinbo's stake would be a substantial asset. But the problem remains the same: time. As of now, Zhuanzhuan "has not yet reached the stage of submitting listing application documents." Distant water can't rescue a nearby fire, and Yao Jinbo's debt predicament remains unresolved.