< b>Yinhua Fund manager Jiao Wei, who oversees a three-year locked-in fund that has lost nearly 40% since its inception, executed a dramatic style shift in the second quarter. He completely sold out of long-held cyclical stocks and went all-in on semiconductors, perfectly timing the market's peak and subsequent correction. This pattern of buying high and selling low has left investors in the < b>Yinhua Furao Select Three-Year Lock-in Hybrid Fund trapped in a difficult situation.
As of July 29, 2026, the fund's net asset value per unit stood at 0.6030 yuan, representing a cumulative loss of 39.70% since its launch. Even more glaring than the persistent losses is Jiao Wei's so-called "chameleon-like" portfolio adjustment in the second quarter. The fund's first-quarter report showed its top ten holdings were entirely concentrated in cyclical resource sectors, including < b>Shaanxi Coal Industry, < b>Chifeng Jilong Gold Mining, < b>CNOOC, < b>Yancoal Australia, and < b>PetroChina, reflecting a defensive value-oriented strategy.
However, by the end of the second quarter, the top ten holdings had been completely overhauled. Semiconductor and technology stocks like < b>Huafeng Test & Control Technology, < b>Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), < b>NAURA Technology Group, and < b>Shennan Circuits all entered the portfolio, while the cyclical holdings from the first quarter were almost entirely sold off. This style drift is far beyond the industry norm.
The second quarter was precisely a critical juncture when the A-share tech sector peaked and then corrected. The semiconductor sector began a sustained decline after hitting a short-term high in June, suggesting the fund likely bought into the market at the peak of the sector's popularity, when consensus was bullish and valuations were at their most expensive. The fund's performance after the rebalancing confirms this: it has fallen another 9.10% in the past month, effectively selling at the bottom of the cycle and buying at the top of the tech rally. This "beat on both sides" strategy resembles amateur retail behavior, not professional institutional investment.
This aggressive repositioning has ignited widespread dissatisfaction among fund holders. Many investors have voiced their outrage, with some asking, "If you bought tech at the end of June, when will we ever break even?" Others demand the fund manager explain the decision-making process, research basis, and timing of the rebalancing. Some investors have angrily stated, "Losing over 40 points in five years—what kind of professional fund manager is that?" and even suggested filing a joint complaint.
In response to investor criticism, Jiao Wei stated in the quarterly report that the "grand narrative" of semiconductors is not his forte. He said his approach is to participate while remaining cautious and vigilant. He added that once the risk boundaries he has set—such as inflection points in fab expansion plans or capital expenditure trends from North American cloud providers—are triggered, and valuation constraints re-emerge, he will be ready to adjust the portfolio again.
For holders of a three-year lock-in product, even if they disagree with the manager's actions, they have no choice but to passively endure the volatility. They are stripped of the option to cut losses, forced to watch their principal shrink. Public records show that Jiao Wei has a total of over 10 years of experience as a fund manager and currently manages 63.67 billion yuan, so he is not a newcomer to the industry. However, the operation of this product raises serious questions about the stability of his investment framework and the consistency of his style.
The shift from rigidly holding cyclicals to going all-in on tech, executed with such decisive timing that perfectly hit the worst spots, inevitably raises the question: Is this a long-term strategy based on deep industry research, or is it simply chasing the hot trend of a fading cycle and a booming tech sector, trying to salvage performance by betting on a single theme? The original intention of a three-year lock-in product is to help investors overcome the human weakness of buying high and selling low, and to practice long-term value investing. But if the fund manager themselves engage in high-frequency style switches and chase hot speculative bets, the lock-in mechanism no longer protects value but instead becomes a trap that locks investors in.
The helplessness of the < b>Yinhua Furao holders, whose trust has been exhausted, and the absurd reality of being locked in for three years only to end up "catching a falling knife" at the top, is a thought-provoking case.