Tianjin Maritime Authority has taken decisive action against a shipping company that demonstrated severe management failures, where a written safety management system was not reflected in actual shipboard records.

During an annual audit of a Tianjin-based shipping company, the authority found multiple ships under its management had been frequently detained, while shore-based supervision remained unaware. Repeated administrative penalties for similar violations continued, with corrective actions proving ineffective. This case highlights the dangers of improper third-party ship management.

The Problem with Third-Party Management

As part of a special campaign targeting shipping company violations, the Tianjin Maritime Authority conducted a comprehensive review. They identified this company as a key problem due to its reliance on managing ships for other owners. Frequent ship detentions and penalties pointed to a classic case of "managing in name only" and "irresponsible third-party management," where safety responsibilities were effectively abandoned.

Uncovering the Truth Through Non-Conformity Lists

From June 3 to 5, 2026, the authority's audit team conducted an on-site annual audit. Instead of simply reviewing documents, the team cross-referenced ship detention records, shore-based monitoring logs, maintenance reports, training records, and penalty files. The findings revealed a safety management system that appeared complete on paper but was completely disconnected from actual operations. The system's "last mile" was entirely missing.

The audit identified multiple non-conformities, including major ones directly pointing to core management failures. The following problems from the non-conformity list illustrate the severity of "management without substance":

Gap 1: Incomplete Captain's Review Reports, Ignored by Designated Personnel

After four ships under management were detained, the captains' review reports all lacked a crucial assessment of the "effectiveness of the safety management system's operation onboard." The company's designated personnel failed to notice this omission, rendering their monitoring function useless.

Gap 2: Repeated Ship Detentions, But Shore-Based Monitoring Failed

The detention deficiencies for these four ships centered on hull and equipment maintenance. However, the company's monthly shore-based monitoring records and maintenance plans showed "no major issues." This created a clear disconnect: ships were in poor condition, while shore records painted a rosy picture. The audit team concluded that the company's operational and technical departments had completely failed to monitor the ships, and the designated personnel had failed to oversee both shore and ship operations, leading to a total system failure.

Gap 3: Equipment Overhauled But Not Tested, Key Safety Devices Rendered Useless

Several ships under management had auxiliary engines overhauled in the first half of 2026. However, post-overhaul tests were not performed, including the low lube oil pressure auto-shutdown test, cooling water high-temperature alarm test, and overspeed auto-shutdown test. These tests are the final safety barrier for equipment operation; skipping them left the machinery running without protection.

Gap 4: Falsified Maintenance Records, Zero Oil Consumption Despite Claimed Change

One ship's maintenance plan stated that the main engine gearbox oil was changed. However, the monthly fuel and lube oil report showed zero main engine lube oil consumption. This contradiction exposed the maintenance plan as nothing more than "paperwork."

Gap 5: Repeated Penalties for Same Issues, Root Cause Never Investigated

Multiple ships under management were repeatedly penalized for the same type of problems. Yet, the company's non-conformity reports always attributed the cause to "crew negligence" and prescribed the same corrective action: "study documents, strictly implement." The recurrence of identical issues proved the company never identified the root cause, making corrective actions completely ineffective and the system's correction process a formality.

Revoking the DOC to Stop Illegal Operations

These non-conformities conclusively proved that the company's safety management system could not function effectively. The company had entirely failed in its safety management responsibilities for the ships it managed.

In accordance with the Administrative Licensing Law of the People's Republic of China and the Regulations on the Administration of Safety and Pollution Prevention for Shipping Companies, the Tianjin Maritime Authority legally revoked the company's DOC certificate. Consequently, the SMC certificates for all ships under its management were also revoked.

This action means all ships managed by the company can no longer legally operate. It represents one of the strictest penalties imposed on a "managing in name only" company since the start of the special campaign.

The Tianjin Maritime Authority will continue the campaign, applying uniform standards to all shipping companies in its jurisdiction. It will thoroughly investigate hidden risks of "irresponsible third-party management" and deal with any company that engages in superficial self-inspections, delays corrective actions, or has a failed system. The goal is to maintain stable water traffic safety conditions in the Tianjin area.