The United States' pursuit of "domestic substitution" aims to restructure a supply chain that excludes China, fundamentally rooted in protectionism and unilateral bullying. Beyond underestimating China's resolve and capacity for countermeasures, the U.S. must also calculate three key costs: the energy transition cost, the AI infrastructure cost, and the innovation cost.

Recently, three U.S. import control policy moves have surfaced, drawing significant attention: preparing to impose at least a 15% tariff on polysilicon and related manufactured goods with a price floor; the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) reportedly studying restrictions on new Chinese optical modules entering the U.S. market; and in late July, the FCC issuing an "import restriction order" on foreign-made inverters and advanced robotics equipment. These three policy moves all target high-tech sectors where China holds clear competitive advantages.

What is the United States trying to do? Is it attempting to emulate China's "domestic substitution"? The logic behind China's and the U.S.'s approaches to "domestic substitution" is fundamentally different. China's development of "domestic substitution" is driven by external "bottleneck" challenges and internal needs for high-quality development. The path relies on self-reliance and independent innovation to achieve breakthroughs in key technologies, laying a solid foundation for open cooperation. The U.S. approach, in contrast, artificially creates "small yards with high fences," attempting to restructure a supply chain that excludes China through tariffs, price manipulation, and access tools. This is essentially protectionism, an unjustified state-led crackdown on Chinese tech companies, and a typical market-distorting, unilateral bullying act that pushes for "decoupling and supply chain disruption."

As evidenced by China's Ministry of Commerce measures announced on August 5, if the U.S. persists, China's countermeasures will not be absent. If the U.S. wants to pursue "domestic substitution" in this manner, besides not underestimating China's determination and strength in countermeasures, it should also calculate three economic accounts.

The first is the energy transition cost. China holds over 80% of global market share in multiple major photovoltaic manufacturing segments, and the U.S. still lacks "seamless alternative" upstream capacity. The proposed U.S. measures not only involve polysilicon but may also cover wafers, cells, and modules. The U.S. is simultaneously discussing compensating domestic manufacturers dependent on imported materials, indicating that tariffs will first impact its own supply chain. If an "industrial security" requires maintaining through more expensive energy, slower construction, and greater subsidies, does it increase security or create fragility?

The second is the AI infrastructure cost. Data suggests that by 2026, global optical module foundry capacity will see Chinese manufacturers account for about 56%, with major Chinese suppliers facing the North American market collectively holding about 46%. Industry insiders believe that achieving "domestic substitution" in this field in the short term is unrealistic for the U.S., and a comprehensive ban would almost be equivalent to directly stalling the construction of U.S. AI data centers. Chinese optical modules also integrate components from multiple countries. Cutting out Chinese manufacturing links would disrupt the global supply chain, and the U.S. would not escape unscathed.

The third is the innovation cost. U.S. restrictions on access to some advanced robotics equipment produced in China could deprive domestic startups and researchers of cost-effective testing platforms. A competitive industrial base cannot be built simply by excluding foreign products, and may even cause it to lose the impetus for comparison, learning, and iteration. A ready example is that the U.S. has long restricted Chinese drones but has yet to form a complete and cost-competitive consumer drone ecosystem.

Undoubtedly, forced "decoupling" from China's competitive industries will come at a cost for U.S. businesses and consumers. Some analysts suggest that the U.S. is pursuing "domestic substitution" for political gain, preferring to "hurt itself a thousand to wound the enemy a hundred." However, can such tactics halt the development of China's innovation capabilities? With a market of over 1.4 billion people, a complete industrial system, and continuously increasing investment in talent cultivation and R&D, China's independent innovation capacity has passed a critical inflection point, making it nearly impossible for external forces to reverse our development trajectory.

In fact, frontier fields like AI, robotics, and clean energy hold immense potential for innovation. China and the U.S. can and should expand exchanges and cooperation, build a more open, stable, and predictable economic and trade framework, and construct a "constructive and stable strategic relationship between China and the U.S." This would enable many actions beneficial to both countries and the world. This is a calculation Washington must understand.